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 Introduction 
Hunting and gathering was the dominant source of food production for most of human history.  
In a relatively short interval, however, agriculture emerged independently and almost 
simultaneously in six regions (Near East, sub-Saharan Africa, China and Southeast Asia, Eastern 
North America, Mesoamerica and South America), and then spread to become a dominant way 
of life throughout much of the world.
1  Why did this happen?  Arguably no prehistoric question 
has received more collective scientific attention, and for good reason.  Few ‘transformations’ in 
early hominid history have had a more profound impact than the agricultural transformation.
2  
Understanding the transition from foraging to farming remains a key focus in many disciplines, 
including anthropology (Bar-Yosef and Meadow 1995), human behavioural ecology 
(Winterhalder and Kennet 2006), and is one of the major challenges of the emerging field of 
paleoeconomics – the branch of economics studying human behavior in the prehistory (see for 
example Ofek, 2001; Horan et al., 2005, in press). 
The beginnings of agriculture is now recognized to be less about the discovery of 
cultivation, or overcoming the “complexities” of domestication, than it is about the level of 
reliance on domesticated species.  Humans likely discovered seeds as the mechanism for plant 
growth long before agriculture took root (e.g., Flannery 1968; Cohen 1977).  Pryor (2004) 
reviews evidence suggesting agriculture was relatively straightforward for primitive foragers, 
                                                 
1 “Simultaneously” in this context spans a broad range of dates.  The origins of farming in the six regions can be 
traced back to the period 13,000 – 8,000 years ago, which is a long time.  But in light of the history of our species, 
which goes back some 150,000 years, it is remarkably close. 
2 One would be hard to overstate the significance of the agricultural transition.  The transition changed the 
fundamental structure of human society, and laid the foundations for such institutions as centralized government.  
Researchers argue agriculture is a necessary precursor for the development of social stratification, state-level 
societies and market economies (e.g., Diamond 1997).  Many of the changes brought about by agricultural 
expansion are related to changes in population densities.  While foragers live at densities of about 1 person per 10 
square kilometers, densities of rice farmers on Java are 10,000 times higher (Winterhalder and Kennett).  The global 
population ballooned from about 10 million people at the eve of farming to over 6 billion nowadays, and this 
increase in population density is a major factor in the evolution of institutions and technology (e.g. Kremer 1993, 
Galor and Weil 1999).   
  1and “proto-plant production” (including the use of fire to encourage new plant growth, flooding 
fields containing root crops, soil aeration and the broadcast of wild seeds) may have existed for 
tens of thousands of years prior to the agricultural revolution.  Domestication of many grasses is 
basic (e.g., cereals and rices) and can occur within as few as one to three years (Harlan 1999; 
Pryor 2004).  Rather, Pryor (2004) and Winterhalder and Kennet (2006) define agriculture to be 
distinct from proto-plant production – agriculture is the near reliance on domesticated species.
3 
Winterhalder and Kennet (2006) suggest 75 percent reliance as a criterion (a self-admittedly 
arbitrary level).  Combined with the evidence on early human knowledge and proto-production 
practices and the ease of domestication for some species, this reliance-based definition suggests 
the agricultural revolution was the widespread adoption of known practices – a change in 
behavior – as opposed to a phenomenon of discovery and innovation. 
Numerous theories attempt to explain a behavioral transition to agriculture, including 
those based on (i) technical change that increased the returns to agriculture (e.g. Marceau and 
Myers 2005; Olssen and Hibbs 2005; Baker 2005; Weisdorf 2003; Rindos 1984; MacNeish 
1992; see Kremer 1993 or Galor and Weil 1999 for a more general treatment), (ii) demographic 
pressure that generated resource pressures and the need to adopt alternative food procurement 
approaches (Cohen 1977; North and Thomas 1977; Smith 1975), (iii) socio-economic 
competition and status-seeking behaviors that encouraged the development of surpluses (Haydon 
1995), (iv) changes in property rights that gave groups incentives to plant crops for their own 
procurement (North and Thomas 1977; Baker 2005), (v) increased diet breadth and risk 
management arising from a co-evolution between human choices, the distribution of wild plant 
communities across the landscape (Winterhalder and Goland 1997; Winterhalder and Kennett 
2006; Piperno and Pearsall 1998; Rindos 1984), and domesticated plants (Rindos 1984), and (vi) 
                                                 
3 Both admit at least some agricultural societies did partly depend on hunting. 
  2climate change (Childe 1951; Richerson et al. 2001).
4  Pryor (2004) lists a number of criticisms 
about applying theories (i)-(iv), and notes that no single theory is likely to provide the sole 
explanation.
5   
In this paper, we combine elements of three theories—climate change, property rights, 
and competitive exclusion—to create a paleoeconomic model of agriculture and its diffusion.   
We focus on climate change as a necessary trigger, which combined with group property rights 
and competitive exclusion processes produced conditions sufficient for the diffusion of early 
agriculture.   
Our climate change perspective follows Richerson et al. (2001) and Piperno and Pearsall 
(1998).  Piperno and Pearsall (1998, p.27) discuss how easily-domesticable species were in 
insufficient quantities prior to the Holocene to be a part of human diets.  But this story changed 
in the Holocene as the climate changed.  Climate changes, for example caused deciduous forests 
to replace productive open grassland foraging environments in the lowland neotropics, with more 
than half of the crops eventually domesticated in the New World coming from these forests 
(Piperno and Pearsall 1998, p.27).  Supporting this view, Richerson et al. (2001) argue climate 
change would have made domestic production of these new plant options more feasible.  Using 
high-resolution climate proxy data taken from ice cores in Greenland and Antarctica, Richerson 
et al. (2001) make the convincing argument that agriculture was all but impossible in the 
Pleistocene.  The climate was too cold, too dry, and too variable.
6  In contrast, the Holocene 
marks a period of warm, wet, and stable climate.  The climate change-agricultural diffusion 
                                                 
4 Rindos’ (1984) discussion of co-evolution, which is somewhat mechanistic and non-optimization-based, differs 
from human behavioral ecologists like Piperno and Pearsall (1998) and Winterhalder and Goland (1997), who do 
assume human choices are being optimized.   
5 For instance, though rooted in the diet breadth model, human behavioral ecology theories have merged elements of 
all six theories.   
6 Climatic fluctuations during the last 100,000 years of the Pleistocene were extreme – think of annual swings in 
mean temperature of 10
oF.  Also, the atmosphere was less rich in carbon dioxide (essential for plant respiration). 
  3theory makes sense if the climatic conditions for farming were only established in the early 
Holocene and not earlier, if many domesticable plants only became available during this time, 
and if people already had knowledge of proto-plant production techniques (Pryor 2004).
7   
Climate change is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, however, for our story to 
hold; rather we combine climate with property rights and competitive exclusion to develop our 
theory for agricultural diffusion.  Following North and Thomas (1977), we theorize that property 
rights played an important role.  They suggest the common property use of resources under 
hunting and gathering would reduce the productivity of hunting and gathering, whereas the same 
would not hold under an agricultural system operated as communal property.  Eventually, they 
claim depletion of common property resources shifted labor allocations to agriculture.  North and 
Thomas state this reallocation of labor does not have to be a conscious process.  Rather groups 
that make more efficient choices will exclude others due to natural selection.  But the 
mechanisms underlying this competitive exclusion process are not formalized.  This begs one to 
ask what competitive forces drive the exclusion process once different groups begin to engage in 
different activities?   
Baker (2005) and Marceau and Myers (2006) develop formal models with private 
property rights to agriculture, in which the state of technology affects adoption, though neither 
model explicitly models natural selection.  Baker (2005) models advances in agricultural 
technology as increasing the marginal value of agriculture, which results in more farming 
activity.  But increased farming reduces the amount of land available for hunting and gathering.  
As agriculture becomes more productive, more land is pulled away from hunter-gatherers who 
                                                 
7 Piperno and Pearsall (1998) note “protracted period of mutualistic interactions between people and the plants taken 
under cultivation” was not required for agriculture to begin.  Some plants would have been easily domesticable in a 
short time (Harlan 1994). 
  4must be physically evicted for agriculture to spread.  Though possible, we believe physical 
eviction is too strong a requirement for agricultural diffusion. 
Marceau and Myers (2006) show how technological change (affecting both foraging and 
farming) could have increased the chances of coordination failures among large bands of hunter-
gatherers who had previously coordinated on conserving behaviors.  The coordination failures 
result in the larger bands splintering into smaller groups who protect their territories, but do not 
cooperate on conservation.  This leads to overexploitation, which increases the relative gains 
from agriculture.  Moreover, increases in agriculture reduce the carrying capacity for wildlife, 
reducing hunter-gatherer productivity and increasing the relative returns to agriculture.  If a 
selection process of farming over hunting were to arise under this framework, it could be driven 
by either resource scarcity or changes in land use.   
Selection as a result of scarcity of a common resource would be an indirect, ecologically-
driven mechanism.  Exploring such a mechanism is the third element of our model—the theory 
of competitive exclusion.  Richerson et al. (2001) describe the spread of agriculture as the result 
of an exclusion process driven by competition for land under competing uses (agriculture versus 
traditional hunting/gathering).  They argue the more efficient regime will generate greater wealth 
and allow the farmers to take over the land via purchase, warfare, or the submission or flight of 
hunter-gatherers.  Though they do not model these processes formally, Richerson et al. (2001) 
are describing an exclusion process based on wealth generation and competing land uses, 
whereby the wealthy farmers physically acquire the land from the comparatively poor hunter-
gatherers.  Such a mechanism based on direct interactions between hunter-gatherers and farmers 
is entirely plausible.  But we believe it is too strong a requirement and that exclusion can occur 
  5indirectly and under much simpler circumstances based on ecological principles and the basic 
economic characteristics of the nutritional goods being produced under the two regimes. 
Our model of competitive exclusion does not require that land is subject to competing 
uses, which enables us to discover how agricultural diffusion could proceed under the simplest of 
circumstances.  We assume agricultural lands and wildlife habitat is distinct, and wildlife are 
harvested as a common property resource.  The common property problem arises because 
harvests occur on common (non-agricultural) lands jointly accessible by either group, or because 
wildlife populations roam freely across territorial boundaries.  Exclusion arises under these 
assumptions not because of a direct physical eviction, but rather due to an indirect ecological 
one.  Exclusion in our model is consistent with the ecological principle of competitive exclusion 
– a process by which one species or group replaces a less efficient one via competition for a 
common resource.
8   
In ecology, exclusion is at the species or group level, as one group is literally restricted 
from existence.  A similar process arises in economics as more efficient producers out-compete 
and eventually exclude less efficient producers from the marketplace.  But exclusion does not 
necessarily have to restrict another group from existence.  Exclusion can also mean to impose 
property rights over a resource or good.  If the excluded resource is a necessary input into 
production of another good, an individual or group that claims exclusive ownership over that 
resource will also be able to exclude competitors from the market – exclusion of the resource 
implies restricting a competing group from existence.  But these types of exclusion – access to a 
resource versus access to existence – are viewed as different.   
                                                 
8 Richerson et al. (2001) indicate that opportunistic hunting by farmers could exert additional competition on hunter-
gatherers.  The implication is this additional competition increases the relative wealth of farmers in their framework.  
But without a formal model the exact mechanisms at work are unclear.    
  6Herein we show exclusion from a non-necessary resource can lead to exclusion at the 
group level.  Even if farmers are less efficient in the competition for the common property 
resource, we find they can outcompete the more efficient hunters by spending some time 
producing from a private property resource.  This diversification in production insulates farmers 
from scarcity in the common pool market.  Moreover, if these diversified farmers continue to 
compete in the common pool market, they can out-compete the more efficient hunters – hunters 
are competitively excluded in the area where they own the comparative advantage.  The model is 
used to explain humanity’s transition from the hunting and gathering of common property 
resources to a more widespread adoption of agriculture, an activity in which property rights (at 
least at the group-level) are fundamental.  This includes protection of the group’s land from 
outsiders, which was common among hunter-gatherer societies (Pryor 2004), and the exclusive 
use of seed that was perhaps brought in from another region (recall many cultivated crops 
originated in lowland tropics).   
The results of our model are consistent with four stylized facts on the transition to 
agriculture: (i) the emergence of agriculture coincided with a major change in the climate; (ii) 
agriculture became the dominant mode of supporting mankind, but its diffusion was neither 
unidirectional nor encompassing.  Periods exist in which ‘farming societies’ like the American 
Anasazi reversed to foraging, and some societies never adopted agriculture.
9  Also, evidence 
suggests combinations of foraging and farming can be a stable strategy – the archaeological 
record suggests that such diversified strategies may have persisted for thousands of years; (iii) 
diffusion of agriculture was slow, taking thousands of years to reach England from the Middle 
East.  There have been episodes of farming and foraging communities living side by side 
                                                 
9 For example, agriculture did not exist in Australia until the 18th century, and hunting-gathering has been dominant 
in North America for a long time. 
  7(Cashdan 1989); and (iv) agricultural expansion did not necessarily imply replacement of the 
extant hunter-gatherer population – sometimes hunters ‘switched’ occupation.  Other times 
agricultural expansion replaced or subsumed foraging communities (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza 1996).  
 
A Model of Decision-Making among Hunter-Gatherers and Farmers 
We develop a model of two separate groups or populations of primitive people: hunter-gatherers 
(H), which we call hunters for simplicity, and farmers (A).  Neither group directly interacts with 
the other, as both groups are territorial and land used for farming does not reduce the habitats of 
common pool resources.  There is evidence that territorialism arose prior to the development of 
agriculture, not in response to it (Marceau and Myers 2006).  We assume climate change has 
recently occurred and made agriculture a viable option; we show later how this viability erodes 
without the productivity enhancements from climate change.  Hunting has been the predominant 
strategy and hunters do not consider farming to be an option.  This could be because the hunters’ 
territory is barren and unamenable to agriculture, they do not have access to the domestic seeds 
or crops (as many of these were endemic to a only a few areas; Piperno and Pearsall 1998), they 
lack agricultural knowledge of skill (though this is doubtful; Pryor 2004, Piperno and Pearsall 
1998), or due to cultural/religious reasons rooted in the hunting lifestyle.
10  Within this 
framework, we investigate whether a “hunting/farming” or “farming-only” strategy could invade 
and ultimately replace a system in which the hunting-gathering strategy currently prevails. 
                                                 
10 In reality hunters, either individually or collectively, would make a conscious decision to not farm.  Though we do 
not model this, it could be modeled using the identity model of Akerlof and Kranton (2000).  They illustrate how 
individuals associate themselves with a particular group and how acting against the group generates psychological 
costs on the individual.  Implicitly, we are assuming sufficiently high costs that hunters never switch occupation.  It 
should be noted, however, that over time it may be possible for an individual to change his/her identity (Bulte and 
Horan 2007), in which case the occupation could change.  We mention such a change in our discussion of the 
simulation results below.      
  8  Each population consists of Ni identical households, indexed by i = H, A.  Both groups 
sustain themselves by consuming food, denoted on a per capita basis by Fi (i=H, A).  Hunters 
consume from a reproducible, common property resource, and farmers may choose to consume 
from this resource as well.  Following Brander and Taylor (1998), we model an aggregate 
resource stock, x, which we refer to as wildlife (though it could include gathered products).  
Denote the per capita amount that group i consumes from this resource by mi.  Agricultural 
products represent an additional food source, produced and consumed at the per capita level pi.  
Per capita food intake is defined as  i i i p m F + = .   
Households maximize a utility function, Ui, which is a function of food consumption and 
also a set of other goods like clothes, tools, and shelter, denoted vi.
11  Utility is defined as: 
(1)  , 
i i




which is a hybrid form of Smith (1975) and Brander and Taylor (1999).  Each household’s time 
constraint is given by: 
(2)   li = ei + ai + yi, 
where li is the total labor endowment, ei is hunting effort, ai is effort devoted to agriculture (or 
gathering), and yi measures effort to produce other goods.
12  Assuming constant returns to scale 
to produce other goods, and we choose units such that vi = yi.   
Agricultural production is represented by  , where μ
η μ i i i a p = i and η are parameters.  
Note μi reflects productivity and also scales the relative nutritional content of crops relative to 
                                                 
11 Following our earlier work (e.g., Horan et al. 2008) and that of others (e.g., Smith 1975; Brander and Taylor 
1998), we continue to assume paleolithic households acted “as if” they maximized a conventional utility function.  
The model creates a "rational early man" benchmark, which serves to introduce basic economic principles into the 
general paleontology literature that has traditionally assumed away such basic factors as opportunity costs and 
tradeoffs.     
12 We do not explicitly model time required to protect the territory or the decision to do so.  Rather, we take as given 
that members of each group are required to devote some time to protection as a condition of group membership.  
Therefore, li can be viewed as the total time available net of this protection. 
  9meat.  Assume agriculture exhibits diminishing returns to labor, i.e.,  1 < η , as non-labor inputs 
such as seeds and tools (and weather) represent limiting factors.  Hunters do not produce 
agricultural products; we capture this by setting μH = 0.   
Finally, harvesting of meat is defined by the standard Schaefer production function 
(Clark 1990):
13
(3)  mi = qieix, 
where qi is the catchability coefficient defining the ease with which wildlife is harvested.  
Hunters have a larger catchability coefficient than farmers, i.e., qH >qA, due to the fact that 
hunters specialize (developing greater skill) and follow wildlife herds more closely than the more 
sedentary farmers.  
Assume these primitive people solve a series of static labor allocation problems, rather 
than a single dynamic optimization problem.  This presumption is consistent with observations 
by Mithen (1990, p.224): “hunter-gatherers do not appear to plan subsistence activities over time 
scales longer than one year.”  Our assumption is also consistent with more contemporary 
instances of open access resource exploitation (see Sanchirico and Wilen 1999; Bulte and Horan 
2003).  We abstract away from spatial considerations and institutional change that might arise in 
response to changes in resource scarcity (see Ostrom 1990, Erickson and Gowdy 2000, Pezzey 
and Anderies 2002).   
Substituting the three production relations into (1), the Lagrangean associated with 
population i’s problem is: 
(4)  .  ] [ ) (
1
i i i i i i i i i i i y a e l y a x e q L
i i − − − + + =
− λ μ
β β η
Optimal labor allocations to agriculture and hunting are 
                                                 
13 A more general specification, albeit analytically less tractable, is the specification m = qex
ϕ and ϕ<1 (e.g. 
Henderson and Tugwell, 1979).  Our main results are qualitatively robust for this extension. 
  10(5)  












































Hunters always supply  H Hl β  units of effort to hunting (recall, μH = 0).  From expression (5), 
farmers always apply positive levels of effort towards agriculture.  In contrast, equation (6) 






















x .  These results arise due to constant returns to labor in hunting and 
diminishing returns in agriculture, which are opposite to the assumptions made by North and 
Thomas (1979).  Full-scale agriculture among farmers results from resource scarcity in our 
model, but our assumptions actually make it less likely that severe resource scarcity will drive 
the widespread adoption of agriculture, as was required by North and Thomas (1979) and occurs 
in Marceau and Myers (2006).  The reason is agriculture pulls labor out of the hunting sector, so 
x is less likely to fall below  . x ˆ
14
Equation (6) indicates farmers apply less effort to hunting than hunters.  Combined with 
the smaller catchability coefficient for farmers, this means farmers are less competitive than 
hunters in terms of per capita consumption of the common property resource, i.e.,  , 
where   represents the optimal level of per capita meat consumption for group i. 
* *




Population and Resource Dynamics 
                                                 
14 Bulte et al. (2006) examine species extinctions in the Pleistocene and find the extinctions likely came from non-
selective harvesting of multiple species.  They also find that agriculture, if it had existed at the time, could have had 
a stabilizing effect on resource populations by reducing hunting pressure. 
  11Population growth (or fertility) in both groups depends on the available food supply, which holds 
for people living close to subsistence (see Frisch 1978; Hansson and Stuart 1990; Nerlove 1991, 
1993; Dasgupta 1995).  Following conventional models of predator populations (e.g., McGehee 
and Armstrong 1977), let the dynamics of population i be described by 
(7)  ,  )) ( ( x F b d N N i i i i i + − = &
where di is the mortality rate, biFi is the birth rate, and bi is a birth rate parameter.  The 
population shrinks (grows) whenever average household food intake falls short of (exceeds) a 
subsistence level, Si.
15  The parameter bi is set equal to di /Si , where Si represents the minimum 
quantity of food that member of each population need to support themselves.  From expression 
(7), if Fi/Si<1, the population growth rate is negative and the population diminishes.  As 
, the population does not change.  If  , the population grows. 1 / → i i S F 1 / > i i S F
16  For 
simplicity, we drop the subscripts from the population growth parameters and assume they are 
equivalent.
 17
  From (5) - (7), we define   to be the steady state resource stock that arises when only 
population i is present (i.e., when N
*
i x
j = 0 for j≠i).  Define:  
(8)   ,   ) /(
* l q S x H H H β =
                                                 
15 Strauss and Thomas (1998) discuss the importance of such thresholds. 
16 This specification of population growth is Malthusian in spirit; it presumes caloric intake governs the dynamics – 
eventually restricting the system to steady states (if they exist) where survival is at the subsistence level.  The 
specification does not address population control, which is a limitation given evidence that contemporary foraging 
societies make efforts to control fertility.  Marceau and Myers (2006) argue that Paleolithic people too controlled 
their populations, and suggest that various methods population control may have been used including “culturally-
demanded abstinence, disruption of the menstrual cycle through extended breast feeding, abortion, direct and 
indirect infanticide (particularly female infanticide) and even dietary cannibalism.”  Examining the consequences of 
fertility choice is an interesting extension of our model, and one we leave for future work. Such socially coordinated 
choices suggest a certain level of planning, cooperation and foresight – features not addressed in our model. 
17These assumptions imply that subsistence requirements are identical for both populations.  Of course hunters will 
have different caloric needs than farmers, but the assumption of a common value of S has little bearing on the 
results. 
  12whereas   is defined implicitly as the solution to 
*
A x
(9)  .  S x F A A = ) (
*
In constructing (9), we assume  S x aA < ) ˆ ( ; farmers who only practice agriculture cannot sustain 
themselves.  Otherwise, the agricultural population will grow without bound (though wildlife 
would not necessarily go extinct: see Proposition 3 below).  It is reasonable to assume the 
original farmers would have had to rely on both agriculture and hunting to sustain themselves, 
particularly prior to the development of animal husbandry which came well after the first 
domestication of plants (Diamond).  The assumption  S x aA < ) ˆ (  also implies  , by 
monotonicity of   for  .   
x xA ˆ
* >
) (x FA x x ˆ ≥
The assumption that agriculture is a less productive activity contrasts with others’ 
explanations based on technical change as a driving mechanism (North and Thomas 1979; Baker 
2005; Marceau and Myers 2006).  North and Thomas (1979) do describe one situation in which 
low productivity agriculture could be adopted, with the impetus being population growth.  As we 
illustrate below, population growth in our model may have a role in the exclusion of hunter-
gatherers.   
Now consider the ecological side of the model.  Wildlife growth is governed by the 
conventional logistic growth function 
(10)   G(x) = αx(1 – x/k), 
where α is the intrinsic growth rate and k is the carrying capacity.  Note k is unaffected by 
agricultural production – there is no competing use of the land for agricultural and wildlife 
production (or hunting).  This is a reasonable assumption for many species even today (though 
many species such as deer and rabbits benefit from agricultural areas), but particularly at the start 
of the agricultural revolution.  Hunter and farmer harvests reduce wildlife growth, and so the 
  13dynamics of the wildlife stock are described by 
(11) 
* * ) 1 ( A A H H m N m N
k
x
x x − − − =α & . 
 
Competitive exclusion 
Competitive exclusion is the principle that, if two similar species occupy the same niche, only 
the more efficient survives and the other slowly goes extinct as they compete for resources 
(McGehee and Armstrong 1977). 
   
Proposition 1.  If agriculture was not an option for the farmers (i.e., μA=0), then the smaller 
catchability coefficient for farmers will lead to their extinction, all else equal.  
Proof.  See Horan et al. (2005, Proposition 1).   
 
Proposition 1 implies that would-be farmers, who are less efficient hunters, could not survive as 
a group if farming were not an option.  Farmers cannot survive on either food production activity 
alone.  But how do they fare when both activities are possible?  The following Lemma and 
Proposition address this question. 
 
Lemma 1: Assume the groups are identical except that  H A q q <  and  0 = > H A μ μ . Also assume 
.  When agriculture is an option for farmers (with or without property rights), an 
interior steady state involving hunters and farmers generally will not exist. 
S x aA < ) ˆ (
Proof:  See Appendix.   
 
  14Proposition 2:   Assume the groups are identical except  H A q q <  and  0 = > H A μ μ . Also assume 
. (i)  If farmers do not have property rights, they will be excluded by hunters.    (ii)  If 
farmers do have property rights over agriculture, farmers will exclude hunters if  , and 
hunters exclude farmers if    









Proof:  See Appendix.   
 
Farmers are not necessarily excluded when agriculture is an option, provided agriculture is an 
exclusive or private property activity and agricultural productivity is sufficiently great (e.g., as a 
result of climate change).  Three aspects of this result deserve attention.  First, we note that 
farmers’ food consumption meets or exceeds subsistence levels when they partake in both 
activities, although they are unable to subsist on either resource alone.  Subsistence is possible 
because the marginal productivity of agriculture is initially very high relative to the marginal 
productivity of hunting.  By operating where the marginal productivity of the activities is equal, 
the farmer can produce more food than could be produced in either activity alone.   
Second, property rights are required to generate sufficient agricultural productivity.  
Property rights over the agricultural resource eliminate competition in this sector that would 
otherwise reduce agricultural productivity and make it impossible for farmers to invade the 
system, let alone exclude hunters.  Climate change that made agriculture a viable and sufficiently 
productive option is also required to ensure  , which is required for farmers to exclude 





Third, property rights over agriculture reduce the ecological effects of competition that 
farmers face over the common property resource.  This effect is key and generates one result that 
runs counter to traditional models of competitive exclusion.  Proposition 2 does not require that 
  15farmers produce more food per capita than hunters, except in equilibrium (see the proof).  
Rather, farmers can invade the system even when they are producing less food than hunters.  The 
reason is that agricultural food production effectively reduces farmer subsistence levels in the 
common property resource sector.  Farmers need to obtain fewer wildlife harvests to subsist than 
they would in the absence of agriculture.  This lower effective subsistence level improves 
farmers’ competitive status in the common property sector.   
Viewed another way, the private property resource insulates farmers somewhat from the 
risk of competition involving the common property resource.  This response to competitive risk 
is partly endogenous, as farmers shift some of their hunting efforts towards agriculture as x falls.  
Note this shift is the result of resource scarcity only and is not specifically related to subsistence 
requirements, as S is not a component of farmers’ utility functions.  Protection from competitive 
exclusion depends on the types of resources being used—private vs. common pool.  Previously 
we illustrated that private property, through its role in exchange of consumption goods obtained 
from a common pool, can be used to generate surpluses to overcome exclusion pressures (Horan 
et al. 2005).  Now we find private property in production can also protect against exclusion, even 
in cases in which surpluses do not initially arise.  Together these results illustrate how economic 
systems help to separate humans from nature. 
Though individual farmers harvest less meat in a subsistence equilibrium involving 
agriculture than do hunter-gatherers, the wildlife stock is smaller in the farming equilibrium, i.e., 
.  This result can only be explained by a larger equilibrium human population emerging 
after agriculture.  It is impossible to derive an analytical condition to indicate when    will 
hold, due to the highly nonlinear nature of  .  But the outcome will depend on the relative 










  16agriculture.  If farmers are sufficiently efficient at producing nutrition and if farmers are not 
much less productive hunters than hunter-gatherers, then    will hold and farmers exclude 
hunters.  Otherwise, farming will not take off.  One factor that helps explain why agriculture 
suddenly became viable in the Holocene is climate change that increased agricultural 





2 fertilization.   
Finally, if agricultural productivity ever did increase to the point in which it was 
sustainable, it is possible for farmers and hunters to both specialize and co-exist (stylized fact II). 
 
Proposition 3.   Assume farmers have property rights over agriculture, and the groups are 
identical except   and  H A q q < 0 = > H A μ μ .  If   and  , farmers and hunters will 
co-exist.  
S x aA ≥ ) ˆ (
* ˆ H x x >
Proof:  With property rights and  , farmers can enter the system at any time.  They will 
not hunt, however, as long as  .  Regardless of whether the initial wildlife stock is large 
enough to induce hunting by farmers, hunters will eventually depress the wildlife stock to 
, at which point farmers no longer hunt and hunters are not excluded. 
S x aA ≥ ) ˆ (










) 1 /( 0 βη β βη + − = = l ae  is the effort level that farmers apply to agriculture when they have 
insufficient incentives to hunt.  The condition   can then be written as 
, or 
* ˆ H x x >
* 1




(12)  ,  
* 1




Condition (12) states the marginal productivity of agriculture when farmers do not hunt exceeds 
  17the marginal productivity of hunting at the hunter-only equilibrium.  For instance, suppose 
hunters were in equilibrium when a small group of farmers entered the region.  The farmers 
would have no incentive to begin hunting, but instead focus their food production efforts solely 
on agriculture.  The idea here is agriculture is so productive farmers no longer compete in the 
commons, eliminating the exclusion pressures on hunters.   
The notion that highly productive agriculture could ensure the continued existence of 
hunters is in contrast to North and Thomas (1979), Richerson et al. (2001), Baker (2005), and 
Marceau and Myers (2006), who suggest that sufficiently great agricultural productivity will 
always result in the demise of the hunter-gatherer culture.  The key to this different outcome is 
the assumption about land use.  We assume agricultural lands and hunting lands are distinct, 
whereas others assume complete overlap.  Reality probably lies somewhere in between, in which 
case farmers would be able to capture all desirable farmland while leaving some lands available 
for hunting.  If more agricultural land reduces wildlife habitat, the net effect may be to reduce the 
hunter-gatherer population but not to replace it.  Both populations may increase if more 
agricultural land increases wildlife habitat, though at some point conflict would be more likely. 
 
Simulation 
We now develop a numerical simulation to illustrate the results.  Following Horan et al. (2005) 
and Bulte et al. (2006), we adopt the following parameter values for a baseline scenario: k=75 
million AU (1 AU = 1,000 pounds of living animal), α = 0.15, d =0.08, S=2.9 AU/year, β=0.6, qA 
= 8.3×10
-11,  A H q q ) 1 ( ψ + = , l=7300, η = 0.45,  045 . 0 = A μ , and ψ=0.05.  The simulation begins 
under the assumption that hunters have been in the area for 100 years when a small group of 100 
farmers enters the region.  At this point, the hunters are not yet in equilibrium with the wildlife 
  18population.  We use an out-of-equilibrium starting point to illustrate how farmers can enter the 
system while generating less food per capita than hunters.  If we instead introduced farmers 
when the hunters were in equilibrium, then the proof to Proposition 2 indicates that farmers must 
consume a greater amount per capita to enter the system.   
Figure 1 illustrates the population dynamics of the baseline scenario.  The farmers can 
enter the system and they go on to exclude the hunters within about 1700 years.  Agriculture may 
have taken several thousand years to spread, and a combination of foraging and farming could 
have co-existed during this period (stylized fact iii).
18
Figure 2 illustrates the ratio of per capita food consumption by hunters relative to 
farmers.  We find farmers are able to enter the region and compete for 90 years before they begin 
to consume more food than hunters.  During this time, farmers are producing less than six 
percent of their food from agriculture – they are primarily inefficient hunters who are able to 
compete using only a small supply of extra food that does not always increase total supplies 
above that of the more efficient hunters.  It takes 122 years for farmers to be producing 75 
percent of their food supplies from agriculture, which is the threshold that Winterhalder and 
Kennett (2006) define for agricultural societies.  This status is short-lived, however.  Farmers go 
through three additional cycles of transitioning from hunters to farmers before they achieve 
agricultural stability 316 years after entering the region (stylized fact ii). 
    Table 1 presents our sensitivity results.  The results are insensitive to wildlife growth 
parameters since, from equations (8) and (9), these parameters have no impact on subsistence 
levels and only affect the total human populations that the wildlife can support.  The results are 
most sensitive to changes in the hunting and agricultural productivity parameters.  If hunters are 
                                                 
18 Though we do not model this explicitly, it is also possible that hunters eventually switched to agriculture during 
this time if they realized their communities were otherwise unsustainable and if they were able to abandon their 
long-held traditions associated with the hunting lifestyle (stylized fact iv). 
  19ten percent more productive than farmers in hunting wildlife, then hunters cannot be excluded.  
Farmers must also be sufficiently productive in agriculture.  A 13.3 percent reduction in η or a 
28.9 percent reduction in μ from their baseline values implies that hunters could then exclude 
farmers.  Alternatively, the interpretation is that even a small (in the case of η) to moderate (in 
the case of μ) agricultural productivity-enhancing CO2 fertilization effect in the early Holocene 
might have tipped the balance in favor of farming (stylized fact i).  It is reasonable that both the 
degree of the fertilization effect and the differences in hunting efficiencies would have differed 
regionally, meaning that hunting would have persisted longer in some regions than in others.   
 
Concluding Remark 
We agree with Pryor (2004)—no one theory tells the full story about the transition to agriculture 
from hunting and gathering.   We construct our model based on three separate disciplinary 
elements:  the geophysical notion that climate change could trigger a productivity gain that 
exceeded a minimal biological threshold, the economic principle of exchange institutions driven 
by well-defined private property rights that can trigger needed investments in agriculture 
resources, and the ecological idea of competitive exclusion in which less-efficient farmers out-
compete more efficient hunters on common hunting grounds given the farmers first spend time 
producing additional nutrition from their private property resource.   In contrast to the human-
dominated technological advancement theories posited in the economic growth literature, our 
model focuses on the joint determination and interaction between humans and nature and the 
feedbacks between the two systems.    Herein we extend further the endogenous risk idea that 
society affects nature/nature affects society, which leads us to a theory that could help explain 
one of the key transition periods in human history—the transformation to agriculture.   
  20  In contrast to other models in which farming emerges as technological progress or 
climate makes it a more productive option than hunting, farming emerges in our model even if 
farmers are poor hunters and cannot sustain themselves with agriculture alone.  Moreover, the 
strategy of farming can invade the system even if farmers initially generate lower per capita 
consumption than hunters.  The key is that the simple innovation of property rights over an 
immobile resource can help to insulate farmers from competitive ecological pressures, moving 
them one small step closer to the modern age in terms of development, but a giant leap away 
from whence they had been for so long in terms of their role within the ecosystem. 
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  25Appendix 
Lemma 1: Assume the groups are identical except that  H A q q <  and  0 = > H A μ μ . Also assume 
.  When agriculture is an option for farmers (with or without property rights), an 
interior steady state involving hunters and farmers generally will not exist. 
S x aA < ) ˆ (
Proof:  For notational convenience, we drop all subscripts except those associated with q and μ.  
Proposition 1, along with the assumption  S x aA < ) ˆ ( , indicate that farmers must spend some time 
hunting to survive in a steady state involving both populations.  Consider the case where farmers 
have property rights.  Given that  A H S S = , equation (7) implies that a steady state involving both 





* * * ) 1 ( A
A
A
A A H H F
x q











































But, from (7), the steady state wildlife stock must also satisfy  , which yields   S mH =
*
(A3)    ) /(
* l q S x H H β =
where   is the value of x that ensures the hunter population attains a steady state.  As 
conditions (A2) and (A3) are both determined by exogenous parameters, the likelihood that 
 is essentially zero.  A steady state involving hunters and farmers will not exist when 




H x x =
x xH ˆ
* >
  When farmers do not hold property rights, produced crops become available as a 
common property resource.  Hunters can only benefit from this arrangement, while farmers can 
  26only lose.  Farmers may have no incentives to grow crops in this situation, which would imply 
their exclusion.  If they did grow some crops, and without specifying the exact nature of the 
labor allocation problem for this case, a steady state must solve both    
* * * * * * ) ( ) ( A A A H H H F x lx q x lx q F = Φ + = Φ + = β β  and  , where   
and 
) (
* * x lx q S H H Φ + = β 0 ) (
* > Φ x H




















A A .  As above, the system of equations is overdetermined, as a 
single value of x
* that solves both equations will not generally exist.  
 
Proposition 2:   Assume the groups are identical except  H A q q <  and  0 = > H A μ μ . Also assume 
. (i) If farmers do not have property rights, they will be excluded by hunters. (ii)  If 
farmers do have property rights over agriculture, farmers will exclude hunters if  , and 
hunters exclude farmers if    









Proof:  If agriculture is a common property resource, hunters have an evolutionary advantage in 
both activities, part (i).  They are more efficient hunters because  H A q q < . Hunters would also 
have an advantage in the agricultural sector because they only have to apply effort to harvesting 
the crops, while farmers must apply effort to both production and the harvest.    
  Now suppose farmers have property rights over agricultural resources, part (ii).  The 
definition of   implies   for each i = A, H.  Note   is monotonically increasing 
in x (for all values of x when i=H, and for   when i=A).  Consider the case where 
(the proof for the other case is analogous, so we do not spend time on it here).  From Lemma 1, 
there is no interior equilibrium involving both populations.  The dynamics of the system are 
*
i x S x F i i = ) (
* ) (x Fi





  27governed by the corner equilibria of hunters-only ( ,  , N
*
H x x =
*
H H N N = A = 0) and farmers-only 
( ,  , N
*
A x x =
*
A A M M = H = 0).   
First consider the hunter-only equilibrium.  Farmers can only enter the system if their 
production of food at the hunter-only equilibrium exceeds their subsistence level, i.e., 
.  Given that S also equals  ,   S x F H A > ) (
* ) (
*
A A x F
(A4)    ) ( ) (
* *
A A H A x F x F >
This condition is only satisfied when  , by monotonicity of  .  Prior to this invasion, 
hunters would be consuming at their subsistence level.  When farmers invade the system, x falls 
and hunters will consume below their subsistence level, resulting in  .  Alternatively, 




A x A F
0 < H N &
0 > A N & *
A x.
Now consider the farmer-only equilibrium.  Hunters cannot enter the system if their 
production of food at the farmer-only equilibrium is less than their subsistence level, i.e., 
.  Given S also equals  , we have   S x F A H < ) (
* ) (
*
H H x F
(A5)    ) ( ) (
* *
A H H H x F x F >
As above, this condition is only satisfied when  , by monotonicity of  .  When 
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Table 1.  Sensitivity Analysis 




α  ––– ––– 
k  ––– ––– 
β  0.4  -33.3 
S  3.9 34.5 
ψ  0.1 
*
η  0.39  -13.3 
μ  0.032  -28.9 
 
*A percentage change is not reported for ψ because ψ  
already represents a percentage change in the hunting 
productivity differential between hunters and farmers. 


















Figure 1.  Exclusion of hunter-gatherers under the baseline scenario 













Figure 2.  The ratio of hunter-gatherer food consumption to agricultural food consumption over 
time 
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